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WE ARE THE WORLD?
JUSTIFYING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S
USE OF CONTEMPORARY FOREIGN LEGAL
PRACTICE IN ATKINS, LAWRENCE,
AND ROPER
Andrew R. Dennington*
Abstract: Since 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court has consulted contempo-
rary foreign legal judgments to help interpret, and dramatically expand,
the substantive scope of the Bill of Rights in three landmark cases. It has
not, however, explained when and why contemporary foreign legal ma-
terials are relevant to a principled, objective mode of constitutional in-
terpretation. This Note represents an attempt to do so. It postulates two
rationales that could retrospectively justify the Court’s methodology in
Atkins v. Virginia (2002), Lawrence v. Texas (2003), and Roper v. Simmons
(2005). One is grounded in a theory of Anglo-American common law,
the other rests on jus cogens and customary international law. This Note
then compares the two and concludes that the jus cogens theory could
best address critics’ concerns that the use of foreign law will undermine
U.S. sovereignty, reduce civil liberties in this country, and vastly increase
judicial discretion.
Introduction
Since 2002, three landmark U.S. Supreme Court decisions—Atkins
v. Virginia,1 Lawrence v. Texas,2 and Roper v. Simmons 3—have collectively
signaled a decisive shift in the Court’s position regarding the relevance
                                                                                                                     
* Andrew R. Dennington is Managing Editor of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. The author would like to thank Professors Charles Baron, Gregory
Kalscheur, S.J., and Mark Spiegel for their advice and encouragement in connection with
this Note.
This Note was also presented at the Yale Journal of International Law’s Fourth Annual
Young Scholars Conference on March 4, 2006 at the Yale Law School. Portions of it also
appeared at Andrew R. Dennington, Hearing Aid: What Democrats Should Ask John Roberts,
New Republic Online, Aug. 17, 2005, http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w050815&s=
dennington081705.
1 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
3 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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of contemporary foreign legal practice to domestic constitutional in-
terpretation.4 In each of these cases, the Court used the legal judg-
ments and experiences of European countries and the “world commu-
nity” as aides in interpreting the substantive scope of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments”5
and the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process clause.6 This
is remarkable given that, as recently as 1997, a majority of the Court
clearly rejected this methodology as “inappropriate to the task of inter-
preting a constitution.”7
Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper have ignited a political controversy in
which conservatives denounce the practice as a threat to national sov-
ereignty,8 and liberals welcome a multilateral dialogue among the
world’s jurists about domestic human rights law.9 Congressional Re-
                                                                                                                     
4 This Note focuses exclusively on the application of contemporary foreign legal mate-
rials to purely domestic constitutional questions, particularly those involving civil rights
and civil liberties. It does not address the use of foreign law to interpret treaties or guide
choice of law in cases involving foreign parties. Those questions pose fewer theoretical
difªculties than the problems analyzed in this Note. See Justice Antonin Scalia, Foreign
Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, Keynote Address at the 98th Annual Meeting of The
American Society of International Law (Apr. 2, 2004), in 98 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 305,
305 (2004). Further, this Note does not concern itself with the use of historical foreign legal
materials in domestic constitutional interpretation. Those materials, particularly English
texts, are more obviously relevant to constitutional interpretation than contemporary foreign
materials because they help illuminate the original meaning of the U.S. Constitution’s now
archaic words and phrases. See id. at 306.
I use the term “foreign legal practice” broadly to refer to the entire range of foreign
materials that the Court consults when interpreting the U.S. Constitution. Liberals tend to
think that Justices on the Court have merely been engaging in a friendly dialogue of sorts
with their European counterparts, and this opinion rests upon the misconception that the
Justices only cite to foreign judge-made rules, such as judgments and judicial opinions.
On the contrary, the Court also consults contemporary foreign statutes, parliamentary
reports, rules of evidence, and even police practices, most of which are not judge-made
rules. E.g. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577–78 (discussion of British parliamentary reports and stat-
utes); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572–73 (discussion of British parliamentary report and stat-
ute); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 673 n.6 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (dis-
cussion of British rules of evidence); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 488–89 (1966)
(discussion of British, Indian, and Ceylon police practice).
5 U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–78; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
6 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573, 576–77.
7 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997).
8 See generally, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Whose Constitution Is It, Anyway? Supreme Court Justices
Are Importing Foreign Law, Signaling a Historic and Deplorable Shift, Nat’l Rev., Dec. 8, 2003,
at 37.
9 See generally, e.g., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of
[Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication,
Keynote Address at the 99th Annual Meeting of The American Society of International
Law (Apr. 1, 2005), in 99 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 351 (2005)
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publicans, upset with the Court’s use of European legal materials to
help expand privacy rights in Lawrence and restrict the death penalty
in Atkins and Roper, have responded by introducing legislation to
sharply restrict the Court’s ability to cite foreign law.10 Judicial conser-
vatives, led by Justice Antonin Scalia, correctly point out that the
Court has yet to clearly explain when and why contemporary foreign
legal materials are relevant to interpreting the U.S. Constitution.11 In
particular, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s sweeping, vague opinions in
Lawrence and Roper have failed to do so.12 As Justice Scalia notes, be-
cause the Court fails to tell us when foreign law is relevant and when it
is not, there is no limiting principle that would prevent a future Court
from one day citing contemporary foreign legal practices to restrict,
rather than expand, domestic civil rights and civil liberties, particu-
larly regarding free speech, criminal procedure, and abortion.13
The best way liberals can answer Justice Scalia is by articulating a
clear theoretical rationale that explains when and why contemporary
foreign legal materials are relevant to a principled, objective mode of
constitutional interpretation. This Note attempts to do that. Part I
provides a brief historical survey of the Court’s shifting attitudes to-
wards the relevance of contemporary foreign legal practice in mod-
ern constitutional law. This background demonstrates that the Court’s
use of foreign law is not the radically new phenomenon many conser-
vatives believe it to be.
Part II begins by outlining Justice Scalia’s legitimate concerns re-
garding the effect that Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper could have on na-
tional sovereignty and the rule of law. Part II continues by describing
two theoretical rationales that might justify and limit the relevance of
contemporary foreign legal practice to domestic constitutional inter-
pretation and applies each to Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper. The ªrst the-
ory, advanced by Justice Stephen Breyer, is grounded in English com-
                                                                                                                     
10 H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005). These bills have at-
tracted considerable support. The House legislation gathered 83 co-sponsors in the ªrst ses-
sion of the 109th Congress. See Library of Congress THOMAS, http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:hr97ih.txt.pdf (last visited
Apr. 11, 2006).
11 A Conversation Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices: The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materi-
als in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia & Justice Stephen
Breyer, 3 Int’l J. Const. Law 519, 524–25 (Norman Dorsen ed. 2005) (comments of Justice
Scalia) [hereinafter Scalia-Breyer Discussion].
12 See Jeffrey Rosen, Juvenile Logic, New Republic, Mar. 21, 2005, at 11, 11 (describing
Justice Kennedy’s reasoning regarding the relevance of foreign law as “analytically sloppy
and glib”).
13 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624–26 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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mon law. It suggests that, because some U.S. constitutional rules are
codiªcations of English common law rules, U.S. courts may consult as
informative, but non-binding, the legal experiences of British and for-
mer Commonwealth jurisdictions interpreting those same common law
rules. A second theory, which the Court has never explicitly adopted, is
grounded in customary international human rights law. It would justify
the Court’s use of foreign legal experience to determine whether a jus
cogens norm applicable to the case exists and if it does, interpret the
U.S. Constitution so as to reºect international standards.
Finally, Part III compares these two rationales and concludes that
the customary international human rights law rationale provides a
more reliable foundation for the future use of foreign law in domestic
constitutional interpretation. By limiting its citation of foreign law in
constitutional cases to a very limited range of cases involving empiri-
cally identiªable jus cogens norms, the Court could mollify some con-
cerns that “activist judges” will use foreign law subjectively, expanding
judicial discretion, and ultimately eroding U.S. cultural and legal sover-
eignty.
I. History and Background
While conservative critics of the Court’s recent use of contempo-
rary foreign legal materials in domestic constitutional interpretation
describe this as an “alarming new trend,”14 this is, in fact, not a novel
phenomenon.15 Several well-known twentieth century decisions con-
sulted contemporary foreign practices and judgments in helping to
determine the substantive content of domestic constitutional rules.16
                                                                                                                     
14 Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on H.
Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot) [hereinafter Appropriate Role of Foreign
Judgments].
15 Infra notes 17–40 and accompanying text. “[T]he reliance on foreign or interna-
tional law that we have seen in the recent cases is, in my view, consistent with our earliest
legal traditions.” Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments, supra note 14, at 14 (statement of
Vicki Jackson, Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center).
16 See infra notes 17–40 and accompanying text. It is still fair to say, however, that the
Court does not consult foreign or international law in domestic constitutional interpreta-
tion nearly as often as its overseas counterparts. See Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reason-
ing and Judicial Review, 28 Yale J. Int’l L. 409, 412 (2003). Harding contrasts the U.S. Su-
preme Court with the Supreme Court of Canada, which “consistently looks to the law of
other nations for guidance and inspiration.” Id. at 411.
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A. 1937–1989
In 1937, Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo consulted foreign legal
practices in Palko v. Connecticut ,17 which considered whether the Fifth
Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause should be made applicable to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.18 Cardozo reasoned
that immunity from self-incrimination and double jeopardy protec-
tion were not rights sufªciently fundamental to be protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment because they were not “of the very essence of
a scheme of ordered liberty . . . [and] justice . . . would not perish” if
they were abolished.19 To support his conclusion, Cardozo pointed to
contemporary foreign experience: “Compulsory self-incrimination is
part of the established procedure in the law of Continental Europe.”20
In 1958, the Court extended this methodology to Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence in Trop v. Dulles,21 which held that the Court should
draw its meaning of the phrase “cruel and unusual punishments” from
“the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society.”22 This opaque language suggested that this “maturing soci-
ety” could be either global or American.23 The Court held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the penalty of forfeiture of citizenship
because, inter alia, “[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for
crime.”24 In subsequent cases, the Court again pointed to foreign legal
practice as cognizable evidence of evolving standards of decency re-
garding application of the death penalty to defendants convicted of
felony-murder25 and rape of an adult woman.26
A survey of contemporary foreign legal practices also ªgured
prominently in Miranda v. Arizona, 27 which famously held that the Fifth
                                                                                                                     
17 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
18 Id. at 322.
19 Id. at 325, 326. This holding, ªrst announced in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78,
106, 111, 112 (1908), has since been overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796
(1969).
20 Palko, 302 U.S. at 326 n.3.
21 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
22 Id. at 101.
23 Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a “Wider Civilization”: Lawrence
and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 1283, 1293 (2004); see Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denomi-
nator Problem, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 148, 148–49 (2005).
24 Trop, 356 U.S. at 102.
25 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982).
26 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10, 600 (1977).
27 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Amendment prohibited admission of statements obtained from defen-
dants during incommunicado interrogation without full prior warning
of their constitutional rights.28 After announcing the new constitutional
rule,29 Chief Justice Earl Warren addressed the dissenters’ concern that
“society’s need for interrogation outweighs the privilege.”30 Surveying
the current state of police interrogation practice in England, Scotland,
India, and Ceylon, the Chief Justice concluded that “[t]he experience
in some other countries also suggests that the danger to law enforce-
ment in curbs on interrogation is overplayed.”31 Warren then asserted,
referring to those former Commonwealth jurisdictions: “Moreover, it is
consistent with our legal system that we give at least as much protection
to these rights as is given in the jurisdictions described.”32 This intrigu-
ing sentence implies that foreign legal standards somehow compelled
the Court to interpret the Fifth Amendment in the manner that it did.33
The Burger Court then referred to foreign legal practice in justi-
fying its subsequent curtailment of constitutional protections for
criminal defendants.34 New York v. Quarles 35 signiªcantly restricted the
scope of Miranda’s exclusionary rule by holding that, in a situation
where a police ofªcer asks a suspect questions reasonably prompted
by a concern for public safety, there exists an exception to the re-
quirement that police ofªcers give that suspect Miranda warnings.36 In
a concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor rejected this
“public safety” exception37 but reached the same judgment as the ma-
jority by reasoning that Miranda’s exclusionary rule did not mandate
the suppression of nontestimonial evidence, in this case, the defen-
dant’s gun.38 O’Connor argued that, “[t]he learning of these coun-
tries [England, India, Scotland, and Ceylon] was important to devel-
opment of the initial Miranda rule. It therefore should be of equal
                                                                                                                     
28 Id. at 478–79.
29 Id. The long-running controversy over whether Miranda announced a constitutional
rule as opposed to a judge-made rule of evidence was ªnally settled in Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000). Holding that Miranda was in fact interpreting what the
Fifth Amendment required, Dickerson noted that Miranda was replete with language sug-
gesting so. Id. at 439.
30 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
31 Id. at 486.
32 Id. at 489.
33 See id.
34 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 673–74 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
35 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
36 Id. at 655–56.
37 Id. at 660 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
38 Id. at 673–74.
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importance in establishing the scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule
today.”39 Justice O’Connor then wrote: “Interestingly, the trend in
these other countries is to admit the improperly obtained statements
themselves, if nontestimonial evidence later corroborates, in whole or
in part, the admission.”40
B. 1989–2002
In the late 1980s, two events set the stage for a conºict in the
Court regarding the appropriate role of contemporary foreign legal
practice in domestic constitutional interpretation. First, as most indus-
trialized democracies sharply restricted or abolished capital punish-
ment, death row inmates increasingly asked the Court to look abroad in
considering whether their sentences offended evolving standards of
decency.41 Second, Justice Scalia joined the Court.42 Justice Scalia
quickly established himself as a vociferous and inºuential critic of the
use of contemporary foreign legal practice in domestic constitutional
interpretation.43
In 1989, Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion in Stanford
v. Kentucky, 44 which held that the execution of a defendant convicted
of a crime at sixteen or seventeen years of age did not violate evolving
standards of decency and was therefore constitutional.45 Justice Scalia
dismissed evidence that Western European legal systems would not
authorize juvenile execution as irrelevant dicta.46 He countered that,
“American conceptions of decency . . . are dispositive” in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.47 This represented a signiªcant departure
from precedent.48 In a similar juvenile death penalty case decided
only a year earlier, the Court had mentioned European legal practices
as cognizable evidence of evolving standards of decency.49
                                                                                                                     
39 Id. at 672.
40 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 673 n.6 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
41 E.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 389–90 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988).
42 Justice Scalia took his seat on September 26, 1986. Supreme Court of the U.S.,
The Justices of the Supreme Court, at 1, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2006).
43 See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n.1 (1989).
44 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
45 Id. at 380.
46 Id. at 370 n.1.
47 Id.
48 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988).
49 Id. “The conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a
person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense is consistent with the
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In death penalty cases in 1999 and 2002, Justice Scalia’s views
again prevailed.50 In Knight v. Florida,51 the Court refused to consider
whether the execution of an inmate who had sat on death row for
nearly twenty years constituted “cruel and unusual punishment.”52 To
prove that there was an international consensus against the practice,
the petitioner in Knight pointed to recent decisions from the U.K.
Privy Council and European Court of Human Rights, both holding
that execution following prolonged delay and multiple execution
warrants could rise to the level of torture and inhumane treatment.53
While Justice Breyer found the reasoning from these and similar for-
eign decisions from Zimbabwe and India highly informative of what
constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment,”54 Justice Clarence Tho-
mas rejected their relevance.55 Two years later, the Court again denied
the relevance of foreign law in a similar death row delay case.56
In 1995, Justice Scalia authored his second majority opinion that
held that contemporary foreign legal experience is irrelevant in inter-
preting the U.S. Constitution.57 In Printz v. United States, 58 which held
that a federal gun control statute unconstitutionally imposed obliga-
tions on state ofªcers to execute federal laws, Justice Scalia rebuked
Justice Breyer for discussing the beneªts that the European Union real-
                                                                                                                     
views that have been expressed by respected professional organizations, by other nations
that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western
European community.” Id.
50 See Foster v. Florida, 123 S. Ct. 470, 470–71 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial
of cert.); Knight v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 459, 459 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
cert.).
51 120 S. Ct. 459 (1999) (denial of cert.).
52 Id. at 459, 461 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
53 Knight, 120 S. Ct. at 462 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (citing Pratt v.
Attorney-General for Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, 29, 33 (P.C. 1993) and Soering v. United
Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 439, 478, ¶ 111 (1989)). Pratt unanimously held that the
execution of two inmates who had been on death row for fourteen years and who had
been read execution warrants on three separate occasions would constitute “torture or . . .
inhuman and degrading punishment” in violation of Section 17(1) of the Jamaican Consti-
tution. See Pratt, [1994] 2 A.C. at 29, 33. Soering held that extradition from Europe to Vir-
ginia of a man charged with capital murder would violate Article 3 of the European Hu-
man Rights Convention Charter because Virginia’s protracted delays in carrying out death
sentences, which averaged six to eight years, constituted inhumane and degrading pun-
ishment. Soering, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. at 478, ¶ 111.
54 Knight, 120 S. Ct. at 462–64 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
55 Id. at 459 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of cert.).
56 Foster v. Florida, 123 S. Ct. 470, 470 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
cert.).
57 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997).
58 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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ized from commandeering: “We think such comparative analysis inap-
propriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of
course quite relevant to the task of writing one . . . . The fact is that our
federalism is not Europe’s.”59
C. 2002–2005
Three cases since 2002 have signaled a decisive shift away from Jus-
tice Scalia’s position. Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper all used contemporary
foreign legal experience as interpretive aides in major decisions that
signiªcantly expanded the substantive scope of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments’ protections for criminal defendants.60 Each deci-
sion drew a successively more deªant dissent from Justice Scalia.61
Atkins held that the execution of mentally retarded defendants is
unconstitutionally “cruel and unusual punishment,” ªnding that a “na-
tional consensus” had emerged against the practice since the Court last
examined the issue thirteen years ago.62 Justice John Paul Stevens then
wrote in a passing footnote that “the world community” also over-
whelmingly disapproved of the execution of mentally retarded offend-
ers.63 He stated that “[a]lthough these factors are by no means disposi-
tive, their consistency with the legislative evidence lends further
support to our conclusion that there is a consensus among those who
have addressed the issue.”64
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia skewered this discussion
of international law:
But the Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate
“national consensus” must go to its appeal (deservedly rele-
gated to a footnote) to the views of . . . members of the so-
called “world community,” . . . . [I]rrelevant are the practices
                                                                                                                     
59 Id. at 921 n.11. Breyer defended himself: “Of course, we are interpreting our own
Constitution, not those of other nations, and there may be relevant political and structural
differences between their system and our own. But their experience may nonetheless cast
an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem
. . . .” Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
60 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
573, 576–77 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
61 Roper, 543 U.S. at 622–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347–48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62 536 U.S. at 316, 321.
63 Id. at 316 n.21.
64 Id.
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of the “world community,” whose notions of justice are (thank-
fully) not always those of our people.65
One year later, Lawrence held that the liberty and privacy interests
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process
clause extended to homosexuals engaging in private, consensual, in-
timate conduct,66 overruling its previous decision in Bowers v. Hard-
wick.67 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion began by attacking Bowers’s
premise that “[d]ecisions of individuals relating to homosexual con-
duct have been subject to state intervention throughout the history of
Western civilization.”68 In response, Justice Kennedy noted that scores
of U.S. states had either abolished or ceased to enforce their criminal
prohibitions on private consensual same-sex sodomy, and that:
Of even more importance, almost ªve years before Bowers was
decided the European Court of Human Rights considered a
case with parallels to Bowers and to today’s case. . . . The court
held that the laws proscribing the [homosexual] conduct were
invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights.
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981) ¶ 52.
Authoritative in all countries that are members of the Council
of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations now), the decision is at
odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was
insubstantial in our Western civilization.69
Justice Kennedy’s use of Dudgeon was not narrowly limited to
overruling Bowers’s historical assumptions but also its essential reason-
ing and “central holding.”70 Referring to the experience of Western
European nations, he argued that “[t]he right the petitioners seek in
this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in
many other countries. There has been no showing that in this country
the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is some-
how more legitimate or urgent.”71 Lawrence made no mention of the
reasoning behind Dudgeon, only its result.72 The mere existence of this
European judgment, its acceptance among many nations, and the fac-
                                                                                                                     
65 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347–48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
66 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
67 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
68 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196).
69 Id. at 573.
70 See id. at 575, 576–77.
71 Id. at 577.
72 Larsen, supra note 23, at 1296–97.
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tual similarities between it and Lawrence, appeared to make it a legiti-
mate aide in interpreting the proper scope of the substantive due
process clause.73
Justice Scalia furiously dissented from every aspect of Lawrence,
including the relevance of contemporary European legal practice to
interpreting the substantive due process clause:
Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence be-
cause some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal
sanctions on certain behavior. Much less do they spring into
existence, as the Court seems to believe, because foreign na-
tions decriminalize conduct. . . . The Court’s discussion of
these foreign views (ignoring, of course, the many countries
that have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy) is
therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since
“this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or
fashions on Americans.”74
In 2005, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Roper represented
a further extension of this methodology and a direct challenge to Jus-
tice Scalia.75 Roper overruled Justice Scalia’s decision in Stanford and
held that the death penalty cannot be imposed on offenders who
were under eighteen years of age at the time of their capital crimes,
citing a “national consensus” that had emerged since 1989.76 While
not essential to his factual ªnding that this national consensus existed
and therefore technically dicta, Justice Kennedy again pointed to for-
eign, particularly British, law and international materials, including
treaties that the U.S. Senate has not ratiªed, as “instructive for [the
Court’s] interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.”77 Comparison to
foreign jurisdictions demonstrated “the stark reality that the United
States is the only country in the world that continues to give ofªcial
sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”78 Justice Kennedy then argued
that “[t]he opinion of the world community, while not controlling our
                                                                                                                     
73 Id.
74 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Foster v. Florida, 123 S. Ct.
470, 470 n. (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of cert.)).
75 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005).
76 Id. at 564–67.
77 Id. at 575–78.
78 Id. at 575. Scalia rejects the notion that foreign views can be relevant to
“conªrming” a national consensus. Id. at 627 n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He writes that
“[e]ither America’s principles are its own, or they follow the world; one cannot have it
both ways.” Id.
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outcome, does provide respected and signiªcant conªrmation for our
own conclusions.”79 Anticipating Justice Scalia’s dissent, Justice Ken-
nedy wrote: “[I]t does not lessen our ªdelity to the Constitution or
our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express afªrmation of
certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply un-
derscores the centrality of those same rights within our heritage of
freedom.”80
D. The Current State of the Law
The Court’s vacillations regarding the relevance of contemporary
foreign legal practices in domestic constitutional interpretation have
produced a confusing jumble of precedent, pro and con.81 At bare
minimum, Atkins and Roper clearly hold that foreign experience is in-
structive in determining the “evolving standards of decency” that guide
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.82 In substantive due process analy-
sis, Lawrence and Palko both can be seen as standing for the proposition
that contemporary foreign legal practices and judgments may also in-
form the Court’s determination of which rights are sufªciently funda-
mental to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.83 Miranda and
Quarles are also still good law, and both suggest that it is proper to con-
sider the experience of other members of Anglo-American common
law community in deªning the substantive scope of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Self-Incrimination Clause.84 Printz is the only one of Justice
Scalia’s majority opinions that clearly rejects the use of foreign law in
interpreting the U.S. Constitution that is still good law.85 One could
infer from this that the Court is willing to consider contemporary for-
eign legal experience in interpreting the scope of the Constitution’s
protections of individual rights but not cases concerning separation of
powers and federalism.86 That may now be the black letter law in this
area, but it is unclear whether the Court itself intended such a result.
                                                                                                                     
79 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
80 Id.
81 Compare Roper, 543 U.S. at 578, with Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11
(1997).
82 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
83 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573, 576–77 (2003); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, at 326 n.3 (1937).
84 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 673–74 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 488–89 (1966).
85 Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n.11.
86 See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
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That is why it is necessary for the Court to re-consider the theoretical
rationale for this methodology.
II. Discussion
A. Justice Scalia’s View: Foreign Materials Can Never Be Relevant to
Domestic Constitutional Interpretation
As an originalist, Justice Scalia believes that “modern foreign legal
materials can never be relevant to an interpretation of—to the meaning
of—the U.S. Constitution.”87 Old foreign legal materials, particularly
from England, may be relevant to understanding the original intent of
the archaic words and phrases in the Constitution.88 Justice Scalia’s
main problem with citing modern foreign law “is not so much that the
law is foreign, but that it is modern.”89 Beyond this originalist critique,
Justice Scalia also objects that this methodology has the potential to
undermine both the rule of law and national sovereignty.90
1. Cultural Sovereignty
Conservative critics argue that contemporary foreign legal materials
are not appropriate interpretive aides because they reºect foreign legal
cultures that may differ signiªcantly from our own.91 For example, Justice
Scalia believes that Justice Breyer’s references in Knight and Foster to Eng-
lish and Jamaican judgments holding that extensive delay in executing a
death sentence renders the punishment cruel and unusual are irrelevant
to interpreting our own constitution, because England and Jamaica lack
the extensive habeas corpus appeals available to U.S. defendants.92 In the
United States, lengthy delays in execution are caused by the defendants’
appeals, rather than solely because of government action, as in Jamaica.93
                                                                                                                     
87 Scalia, supra note 4, at 307. Some jurists attempt to defend the use of foreign mate-
rials from an originalist perspective. See Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 352. Justice Ginsburg
argues: “The drafters and signers of the Declaration of Independence cared about the
opinions of other peoples . . . . The Declarants stated their reasons [for independence]
‘out of a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind.’” Id.
88 See Scalia, supra note 4, at 306.
89 Michael C. Dorf, The Use of Foreign Law in American Constitutional Interpretation: A Re-
vealing Colloquy Between Justices Scalia and Breyer, FindLaw’s Writ, Jan. 19, 2005, http://writ.
ªndlaw.com/dorf/20050119.html.
90 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622–28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91 See Foster v. Florida, 123 S. Ct. 470, 470 n. (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial
of cert.).
92 See Scalia-Breyer Discussion, supra note 11, at 528–29 (comments by Justice Scalia).
93 See id.
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In Roper, he similarly attacked the Court’s “special reliance on the laws of
the United Kingdom . . . . a country that has developed, in the centuries
since the Revolutionary War—and with increasing speed since the United
Kingdom’s recent submission to the jurisprudence of European courts
dominated by continental jurists—a legal, political, and social culture
quite different from our own.”94
2. Threat of Restricting Domestic Civil Rights
Critics of the Court’s methodology point out that the use of for-
eign law is a two-way street; so long as the Court deems it relevant to all
cases interpreting the Constitution, it can also be used to restrict the
scope of constitutional rights in the United States.95 The United States
has a unique constitutional jurisprudence, whose precepts are now
deeply embedded in American culture.96 The United States affords its
citizens uniquely extensive protections in the areas of criminal proce-
dure, free speech, defamation, separation of church and state, and re-
productive rights.97 Justice Scalia noted in Roper that the Court has
never considered foreign views in interpreting the First Amendment or
the Sixth Amendment, though it has articulated no clear reason why
those views should not be taken into consideration.98 In his words, the
Court does not take its own directive seriously.99
3. Increased Judicial Discretion
Justice Scalia also argues that the Court’s inconsistent use of con-
temporary foreign legal experience undermines the rule of law be-
cause, by expanding the universe of law that judges can apply to any
particular set of facts, the ultimate disposition of the case becomes
less predictable and more likely to vary from judge to judge.100 He
writes: “To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking,
and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophis-
try.”101 What particularly irks Justice Scalia is that the Court has men-
tioned foreign legal experience in cases concerning the rights of ho-
                                                                                                                     
94 543 U.S. at 626–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95 See id. at 624–26.
96 See id.
97 Id.
98 See id. at 624–25.
99 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100 Scalia, supra note 4, at 309.
101 Roper, 543 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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mosexuals but not abortion cases, despite the fact that both are inter-
preting the same substantive due process clause.102
B. Justice Breyer’s View: Contemporary Materials from the
Anglo-American Common Law Community Can Be
Relevant to Constitutional Interpretation
Justice Breyer has a different view, implicitly arguing that the Court
can justiªably consult the contemporary experiences of British and
former Commonwealth jurisdictions if and when it interprets constitu-
tional rules that have their origins in English common law.103 Several
provisions of the U.S. Constitution represent codiªcations of important
principles of English common law as they existed in 1789.104 For exam-
ple, the Eighth Amendment prohibition against “cruel and unusual
punishments” was taken almost verbatim from Section 10 of the English
Declaration of Rights of 1689, which provided “[t]hat excessive Baile
ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and
unusuall Punishments inºicted.”105 The Fifth Amendment rule regard-
ing the admission of coerced confessions also traces its origins back to a
standard of English common law at the time of the Constitution.106
Many other common law nations have laws regarding cruel and un-
usual punishment and the privilege against self-incrimination that are
derived from the same common law that is reºected in the Eighth
Amendment107 and the Fifth Amendment.108 Given these historical and
                                                                                                                     
102 See id. at 625-26.
103 See Foster v. Florida, 123 S. Ct. 470, 472 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.); Knight v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 459, 462-63 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.). In practice, however, Justice Breyer has not limited his use of foreign law to materi-
als from within the Anglo-American common law community. See, e.g., Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Swiss, German, and
European Union experience).
104 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 966 (1991).
105 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966.
106 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433.
107 The textual similarities between the Eighth Amendment and similar prohibitions in
the constitutions of former Commonwealth jurisdictions are evidence that they share a
common historic ancestor in the English Bill of Rights of 1689. See, e.g., Can. Const. pt. I,
§ 12 (“Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment.”); Jam. Const. ch. III, § 17(1) (“No person shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment.”); Zimb. Const. ch. III, § 15(1)
(“No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or
other such treatment.”).
108 See Jeffrey K. Walker, A Comparative Discussion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
14 N.Y. L. Sch. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1, 6, 12, 14, 19 (1993) (describing how U.S., English,
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textual connections, when a U.S. court is presented with a difªcult or
novel question concerning the proper interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment or Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause, it might
consult, for example, the judgments of English, Canadian, and Indian
courts that wrestled with similar questions.109 This common law dia-
logue among jurists would resemble what U.S. state supreme courts do
when they look at decisions from neighboring states regarding com-
mon law principles of property, contracts, and torts as informative but
non-binding guides.110 Under this approach, the relevance of the for-
eign rule to domestic constitutional interpretation is always non-
binding; it depends upon the depth of its reasoning rather than simply
its result.111
Justice Breyer’s well-reasoned dissents in Knight and Foster provide
an illustration of this methodology at work.112 In considering whether
the execution of a defendant after he had sat on death row for nearly
twenty years constituted cruel and unusual punishment, Justice Breyer
compared and contrasted judgments from common law courts— in-
cluding England, Jamaica, Canada, and Zimbabwe—that were also in-
terpreting constitutions that banned “torture or . . . inhuman or degrad-
ing punishment.”113 Most reasoned that the “suffering inherent in a
prolonged wait for execution” undermined the sentence’s basic re-
tributivist or deterrent purpose, making the subsequent execution un-
constitutionally disproportionate punishment.114 Justice Breyer noted
that these decisions were “relevant and informative” precisely because
these common law jurisdictions were applying “standards roughly com-
parable to our own constitutional standards,” which all derived from a
common ancestor.115 Some lower federal courts follow this comparative
                                                                                                                     
Canadian, and Indian rules regarding the privilege against self-incrimination share com-
mon historical origins).
109 See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 459, 462-63 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.).
110 See Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments, supra note 14, at 54–55 (testimony of Prof.
Vicki Jackson).
111 See Scalia-Breyer Discussion, supra note 11, at 523 (comments of Justice Breyer). This
use contrasts with the “moral fact-ªnding” approach criticized by Professor Larsen, where
foreign rules are treated as relevant irrespective of the reasoning behind the rule. See Lar-
sen, supra note 23, at 1295–96.
112 See Foster v. Florida, 123 S. Ct. 470, 472 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.); Knight, 120 S. Ct. at 462–63 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
113 Knight, 120 S. Ct. at 463 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
114 See id. at 462.
115 Id. at 463–64; see also Foster, 123 S.Ct. at 472 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.)
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common law rationale in post-Lawrence decisions that use contempo-
rary foreign legal practice as an aide in interpreting the scope of the
Eighth Amendment116 and the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination
Clause.117
1. Application to Atkins
This common law theory of comparative constitutional law would
not justify the Court’s use of foreign legal materials in Atkins.118 Atkins
cited to legal practice and opinion in the “world community” writ large,
with no special emphasis on common law jurisdictions.119 Justice Stev-
ens took no account of the reasons why foreign legal courts and legisla-
tures rejected execution of the mentally retarded; the foreign rules
were relevant because of their results, not their reasoning.120
2. Application to Lawrence
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence did focus on British legal
experience, including parliamentary reports and acts, in informing his
interpretation of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive
due process clause.121 Lawrence primarily relied, however, on a decision
from the European Court of Human Rights rather than a British
court.122 Further, the European Court was interpreting a document, the
European Convention on Human Rights, which postdates the Four-
teenth Amendment by almost a century and whose operative language
differs signiªcantly.123 The respective rights to privacy protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment and European Convention on Human Rights
                                                                                                                     
116 See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 49, 65–66, 83–84 (D. Mass. 2003)
(discussing English experience with the death penalty in considering defendant’s claim
that the Federal Death Penalty Act violates the Eighth Amendment).
117 See, e.g., United States v. Sasson, 334 F. Supp. 2d 347, 373–75 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (dis-
cussing English judgments regarding the admissibility of evidence found as a result of
compelled self-incrimination in interpreting the scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule).
118 See 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
119 Id.
120 See Larsen, supra note 23, at 1295–96, 1296 n.59.
121 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2002).
122 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 40, 54, ¶ 97 (1980) (cited in
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573, 576–77).
123 See id. The text of Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights is far
more explicit about announcing a right to privacy than is the text of Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution. Compare Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8(1), Eur. T.S. 5 (“Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life . . . .”), with U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1 (no state
shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
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do not share a common law ancestor.124 Justice Kennedy’s use of for-
eign law is also inconsistent with this theory of common law dialogue
because it did not make the relevance of the legal rule contingent on
the strength of its reasoning.125 Justice Kennedy did not mention the
reasoning behind Dudgeon, assuming that the “human freedom” pro-
tected by Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
was interchangeable with the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive due process clause.126 However desirable Jus-
tice Kennedy’s decision was on the merits, his use of foreign legal mate-
rials as an interpretive aide was unsupported by a common law theory
of comparative constitutional law.127
3. Application to Roper
Justice Kennedy adopted this comparative common law approach
more explicitly in Roper, again placing particular emphasis on British
materials.128 He argued: “[T]he United Kingdom experience bears par-
ticular relevance here in light of the historic ties between our countries
and in light of the Eighth Amendment’s own origins.”129 Justice Ken-
nedy mentioned the Eighth Amendment’s ancestor, the English Decla-
ration of Rights of 1689, and discussed how the U.K. recognized the
disproportionate punishment inherent in the juvenile death penalty
and abolished it in 1948.130 Implicitly, Justice Kennedy seemed to be
reasoning that the British interpretation of what constitutes “cruel and
unusual punishment,” reºected in its parliamentary acts and govern-
ment policies, was a well-reasoned rule that could represent a similarly
sensible interpretation of the parallel American rule.131
                                                                                                                     
124 Compare Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8(1), Eur. T.S. 5 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life . . . .”), with U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1 (no state shall “deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”). Substantive due process, unlike
procedural due process, has only a tenuous historical connection to the common law
reºected in the Magna Carta’s per legem terrae. See Hurtado v. People of California, 110 U.S.
516, 531–32 (1884).
125 See Larsen, supra note 23, at 1297.
126 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573, 576–77.
127 See supra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.
128 See 543 U.S. 1183, 1199–1200 (2005).
129 Id. at 1199.
130 Id. at 1199–1200.
131 See id. Justice Kennedy generally refers to British statutes and practices, while Justice
Breyer generally refers to British judge-made rules. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
577–78 ( Justice Kennedy’s discussion of British parliamentary reports and statutes); Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (Kennedy’s discussion of British parliamentary report
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C. An Alternative View: Jus Cogens and Constitutional Interpretation
A second, far more politically controversial theory that could jus-
tify the Court’s recent use of contemporary foreign legal practice is
grounded in the doctrine of customary international human rights
law.132 In 1900, the Court held in The Paquete Habana133 that,
“[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.”134 Paquete Habana also recognized that a rule of inter-
national law can become binding through the “customs and usages of
civilized nations.”135 A norm crystallizes into a rule of customary inter-
national law when there is sufªcient state practice consistent with it and
opinio juris, meaning states follow the practice from a sense of legal ob-
ligation.136
As Paquete Habana suggests, however, customary international law
is part of U.S. law only to a very limited extent.137 Paquete Habana’s
holding only applies to a fact pattern to which no controlling U.S. ex-
ecutive, legislative, or judicial act can be applied, which in that case
involved a foreign ªshing vessel seized in international waters as a
prize of war.138 In contrast, when a U.S. statute controls the facts of the
case, federal courts have held that customary international law cannot
supplant that domestic law.139
                                                                                                                     
and statute); Knight v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 459, 462-63 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.) ( Justice Breyer’s discussion of British and Commonwealth judicial opin-
ions). To a judge using this comparative common law approach, foreign statutes are less
useful than foreign judgments because they are rarely accompanied by readily discernable
reasoning. See id.
132 See generally Ken I. Kersch, Multilateralism Comes to the Courts, 154 Pub. Int. 3 (2004)
(a conservative criticism of applying customary international human rights law in the fed-
eral courts).
133 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
134 Id. at 700.
135 Id.
136 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(b), 59
Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (referring to “international custom, as evidence of a general prac-
tice accepted as law”); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S.
§ 102(2) (1987) [hereinafter Foreign Relations Restatement] (“Customary interna-
tional law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation.”).
137 175 U.S. at 700.
138 Id.
139 Munoz v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Yousef, 327
F.3d 56, 93 (2d Cir. 2003).
288 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 29:269
Federal appellate courts hold that only in rare situations when a
rule of customary international law has ripened into a jus cogens norm
does it enjoy nonderogable and peremptory status such that it could
trump U.S. law.140 The concept of a jus cogens peremptory norm is
difªcult to describe.141 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties deªnes it somewhat tautologically: “[A] peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted . . . .”142 U.S. federal courts recog-
nize the universal nature of jus cogens, which “embraces customary
laws considered binding on all nations” and “is derived from values
taken to be fundamental by the international community, rather than
from the fortuitous or self-interested choices of nations.”143 In other
words, a jus cogens norm differs from a mere rule of customary inter-
national law in that it enjoys near universal acceptance.144 Basic rules
of international human rights law that protect the intrinsic dignity of
the human person enjoy such status.145
Jus cogens doctrine could justify the use of contemporary foreign
legal practice in interpreting the Eighth Amendment.146 Federal case
law and the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law state that prohibitions against ofªcial torture and cruel and
                                                                                                                     
140 Cf. United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing
Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939–40 (D.C. Cir. 1988))
(holding that the kidnapping of a defendant by government agents in Honduras for pur-
poses of bringing defendant to the United States to face trial was not justiciable in federal
court because it did not violate a recognized U.S. constitutional or statutory provision or a jus
cogens norm, given that the prohibition against kidnapping does not qualify as a jus cogens
norm); see also Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 136, at § 102 cmt. k.
141 See Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human
Rights, 12 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 411, 414 (1989).
142 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
143 Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing David F.
Klein, A Theory for the Application of the Customary International Law of Human Rights by Domes-
tic Courts, 13 Yale J. Int’l L. 332, 350–51 (1988)).
144 See id.
145 See Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 136, at § 702 cmt. n. These in-
clude protections against genocide, slavery, torture, and state-sponsored murder. Id.
146 See, e.g., Geoffrey Sawyer, Comment, The Death Penalty Is Dead Wrong: Jus Cogens
Norms and the Evolving Standard of Decency, 22 Penn St. Int’l L. Rev. 459, 481 (2004); Kha
Q. Nguyen, Note, In Defense of the Child: A Jus Cogens Approach to the Capital Punishment of
Juveniles in the United States, 28 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 401, 436 (1995).
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unusual punishment enjoy jus cogens status.147 Because these nondero-
gable prohibitions are binding on all states, and the responsibility to
follow them are obligations erga omnes,148 it makes sense that the
United States must interpret its own constitutional prohibition against
“cruel and unusual punishment” so as to afford its citizens at least as
much protections as jus cogens norms demand.149 The Court’s “evolv-
ing standards of decency” jurisprudence already embodies the natural
law concept of jus cogens and recognizes the Eighth Amendment as a
human rights law: “The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment is nothing less than the dignity of man . . . .”150
Jus cogens might also play a legitimate role in interpreting the scope
of the due process clause in cases involving arbitrary detention or abu-
sive interrogation techniques.151 The Fourteenth Amendment already
prohibits state law enforcement conduct that “shocks the conscience”
or interferes with rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”152
Like the “evolving standards of decency” test in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, this broad, universal language seems to allow room for a
consideration of foreign views.153 Therefore, in an unusual case where
the arbitrary detention or torture of a party did not violate a recog-
nized U.S. constitutional or statutory provision but nonetheless fell be-
low universally accepted human rights standards, the Court might re-
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment “up” so that it at least reºect jus
cogens norms.154 It is likely that such a case could soon come before the
                                                                                                                     
147 Blake, 965 F.2d at 717; Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 136, at § 702
cmt. n; see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (referring to the ban
on ofªcial torture as “part of customary international law”).
148 See Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 136, at § 702 cmt. o.
149 See Nugyen, supra note 146, at 437–38; see also Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Teree E.
Foster, More Speech, Less Noise: Amplifying Content-Based Speech Regulations Through Binding
International Law, 18 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 59, 90 (1995) (proposing jus cogens as “a
constitutional interpretive device” for the First Amendment); Parker & Neylon, supra note
141, at 457 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court has been “using jus cogens analysis,
though not the term ‘jus cogens’” in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment).
150 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
151 See Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 136, at § 702(e) (recognizing the
prohibition against state practice or encouragement of “prolonged arbitrary detention” as
a jus cogens norm).
152 See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 787 (2003) (citing Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172 (1952)); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937).
153 See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 787; Palko, 302 U.S. at 325-26.
154 See Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 136, at § 702(e); cf. Palko, 302
U.S. at 325–26 (considering foreign legal practice but refusing to reinterpret the Four-
teenth Amendment “up” where the existing U.S. constitutional rule concerning double
jeopardy did not fall below international human rights standards).
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Court because, as the U.S. legal system increasingly condones interro-
gation techniques that its European counterparts would not, there is a
greater possibility that U.S. constitutional rules regarding torture may
afford detainees less robust protection than customary international
law.155
1. Application to Atkins and Roper
The Court could have used jus cogens doctrine to support its deci-
sions banning the juvenile death penalty in Roper and execution of the
mentally retarded in Atkins.156 In determining whether a rule of cus-
tomary international human rights law has crystallized into a jus cogens
norm, a court must examine contemporary state practices for indicia of
near universal acceptance.157 Without couching it in the language of
international law, Justice Kennedy essentially did this by conducting a
factual survey of legal practices throughout the world, including both
foreign law and international treaties, concerning the death penalty.158
Noting that even notorious human rights violators such as Iran, Yemen,
and China no longer executed juvenile offenders, Justice Kennedy
concluded: “In sum, it is fair to say that the United States now stands
alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death pen-
alty.”159 These facts could have supported the conclusion that the inter-
national custom prohibiting the juvenile death penalty had ripened
into a jus cogens norm and was therefore controlling in this case.160
Stevens could have used similar reasoning to support the Court’s
decision in Atkins, given his factual ªnding that “within the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed
                                                                                                                     
155 See Rosen, supra note 12, at 12 (noting disagreements between Europeans and
Americans regarding the appropriate line between privacy and security after September
11, 2001).
156 See Carrie Martin, Comment, Spare the Death Penalty, Spoil the Child: How the Execution
of Juveniles Violates the Eighth Amendment’s Ban on Cruel and Unusual Punishment in 2005, 6 S.
Tex. L. Rev. 695, 719–24 (2005); Sawyer, supra note 146, at 481. See generally Nguyen, supra
note 146. But see Young, supra note 23, at 150 n.16 (arguing that few “domestic lawyers
[could] take . . . seriously” the contention that the prohibition of the juvenile death pen-
alty is a jus cogens norm that controls the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment).
157 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), supra note 136; For-
eign Relations Restatement, supra note 136, at § 102(2).
158 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005).
159 Id. at 575.
160 See id.; see also Nguyen, supra note 146, at 433–35 (presenting empirical evidence of
a jus cogens norm prohibiting juvenile executions).
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by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”161
While the Court refuses to admit that when it consults “evolving stan-
dards of decency” throughout the “world community” in death pen-
alty cases, it is really interpreting the U.S. Constitution to reºect in-
ternational human rights law,162 some lower federal courts are willing
to follow the lead and cite Atkins for this proposition.163
2. Application to Lawrence
Customary international human rights law cannot similarly justify
Lawrence’s use of foreign law.164 Unlike the prohibition against ofªcial
torture reºected in the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s right to engage in private, consensual, intimate contact free
from government interference does not have sufªcient state practice to
have ripened into a rule of customary international law.165 Further,
Lawrence’s discussion of foreign law was limited to a discussion of how
“Western” jurisdictions conceive of human freedom rather than how
the world community writ large perceives it.166
                                                                                                                     
161 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). “The Court’s reasoning in At-
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cogens.” Sawyer, supra note 146, at 481.
162 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21. Prior to Roper, the Court declined to entertain
claims that the juvenile death penalty violated customary international law or a principle
of jus cogens. Domingues v. Nevada, 528 U.S. 963 (1999), denying cert. to Domingues v. State,
961 P.2d 1279, 1279-80(Nev. 1998).
163 See, e.g., Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 201–02 (D. Mass. 2004) (reafªrming
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Rights”).
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Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (2003) (concurring opinion), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/MasterFrameView/3c839cb2ae3bef6fc1256dac002b30
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165 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
“many countries . . . have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy”).
166 See id. at 573, 576–77; see also Scalia-Breyer Discussion, supra note 11, at 531 (com-
ments of Justice Scalia).
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III. Analysis
The previous section described two theories that might justify
and limit the relevance of contemporary foreign legal practice in do-
mestic constitutional interpretation: a comparative common law ap-
proach and a customary international human rights law approach.167
This section compares the two and argues that the customary interna-
tional human rights law approach would best address the concerns
that Justice Scalia expressed regarding the possible misuses of foreign
law in constitutional cases.168 Its adoption by the Court would better
strengthen the political position of its “internationalist” wing, led by
Justice Breyer, by restricting the use of foreign law in domestic consti-
tutional interpretation to a limited number of cases in which the hu-
man rights considerations are the most pressing.169
A. Cultural Sovereignty
The customary international human rights law rationale better
addresses Justice Scalia’s concern that the Court will import alien cul-
tural norms and impose them upon a nation that has not assented to
them.170 As noted above, a rule of customary international law can only
be used to trump existing U.S. law if it has attained jus cogens status.171
Jus cogens human rights norms, which by deªnition must enjoy near
universal acceptance, transcend cultural differences in that they have
their origins in natural law.172 They only regulate a few categories of
behavior—genocide, slavery, murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary de-
tention, systematic racial discrimination—that offend an intrinsic dig-
nity of the human person that all cultures recognize.173 Their applica-
tion to U.S. constitutional interpretation would not, therefore, impose
alien cultural norms on the United States.174
                                                                                                                     
167 See supra notes 103–17, 132–55 and accompanying text.
168 See infra  notes 170–94 and accompanying text.
169 See infra notes 170–94 and accompanying text.
170 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
171 See United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).
172 See Mark W. Janis, The Nature of Jus Cogens, 3 Conn. J. Int’l L. 359, 361 (1988).
173 Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 136, at § 702. For example, most of
these human rights are mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose
preamble recognizes the “inherent dignity . . . of all members of the human family . . . .”
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, preamble, arts. 4, 5, 9, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
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174 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl., arts. 4, 5, 9, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (Dec. 12, 1948); Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note
136, at § 702.
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In contrast, a common law approach to comparative constitutional
law does run the risk of importing foreign cultural norms into the U.S.
Constitution.175 For example, federal courts that use contemporary
British legal materials to justify limiting the scope of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Self-Incrimination Clause176 are watering down Miranda warn-
ings that have become deeply embedded in an American culture that
has a unique conception of civil liberties that our common law cousins
do not necessarily share.177 This is precisely the evil that Justice Scalia
condemned in Roper: “special reliance on the laws of the United King-
dom . . . a country that has developed, in the centuries since the Revo-
lutionary War—and with increasing speed since the United Kingdom’s
recent submission to the jurisprudence of European courts dominated
by continental jurists—a legal, political, and social culture quite differ-
ent from our own.”178 In this respect, the use of contemporary foreign
legal materials under the common law approach does pose a threat to
U.S. cultural sovereignty.179
B. Potential to Justify Restriction of Domestic Civil Rights
Unlike the comparative common law approach, the customary in-
ternational human rights law rationale would, by deªnition, never be
used to restrict the scope of individual rights in the United States.180
While the use of contemporary legal materials from Britain and former
Commonwealth countries in interpreting those provisions of the Bill of
Rights with common law origins would generally result in the expan-
sion of individual rights in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,181 the
opposite is true in Fifth Amendment cases.182 In contrast, customary
international human rights law would be used to set a ºoor, not a ceil-
                                                                                                                     
175 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 673–74 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring);
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178 543 U.S. at 626-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ing, for the protection of domestic civil rights and civil liberties.183 If a
domestic constitutional rule already provided a claimant superior pro-
tection than a prevailing international norm, the Court could uphold
the domestic rule “unless the ordinary conditions for overcoming the
presumption of stare decisis were met.”184 If the Court limited its use of
contemporary foreign legal materials only to a search for jus cogens ap-
plicable to domestic constitutional interpretation, foreign law would
not be invoked, as it was in Quarles, to reduce the scope of individual
civil rights and civil liberties.185
C. Increased Judicial Discretion
Finally, the customary international human rights law rationale
would result in a more objective, predictable application of foreign
legal practice to domestic constitutional interpretation than would
the comparative common law approach.186 While the theoretical un-
derpinnings of jus cogens may be abstract, the American Law Institute’s
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations and the federal courts have suc-
ceeded in limiting its substantive scope to a few areas central to the
protection of human dignity.187 Because these jus cogens norms must
enjoy near universal state acceptance, as Professor Nadine Strossen
argues: “The existence and acceptance of international human rights
norms are matters susceptible to objective determination.”188 Under
the customary international human rights law rationale, the use of
contemporary foreign legal practice could be limited to interpreta-
tion of the Eighth Amendment,189 dealing with the jus cogens prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment, and the due process
clause, dealing with the jus cogens prohibition against torture and arbi-
trary detention.190 In the rare case where state practice violated jus
                                                                                                                     
183 See Strossen, supra note 180, at 806–07.
184 Larsen, supra note 23, at 1325.
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cogens and existing U.S. law did not already provide a remedy, then a
judge would be obliged to apply the jus cogens norm because that
norm is binding and nonderogable erga omnes (to all states).191
In contrast, a judge following the comparative common law ra-
tionale is afforded wide discretion to either consult or ignore contem-
porary foreign legal practices in interpreting the Eighth and Fifth
Amendments.192 The decisions of British and former Commonwealth
courts would be always informative, but never binding, and the tempta-
tion to make the relevance of the foreign rule depend upon how well it
comports with a desired result may be too great to resist.193 While U.S.
state supreme court judges already enjoy a similar level of discretion
when consulting judgments from other state supreme courts in inter-
preting common law and their own state constitutions, the threat that
wide judicial discretion can pose to a stable rule of law is ampliªed
when applied to federal courts interpreting constitutional rules with
enormous political and social consequences.194
Conclusion
Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper all reached desirable results on the mer-
its, but all three failed to explain when and why the Court should use
contemporary foreign legal practices to assist in domestic constitutional
interpretation.195 Without clear guidelines, the application of foreign
law to U.S. constitutional interpretation poses several problems.196
These risks include the erosion of national sovereignty, vastly increased
judicial discretion, and the possibility of someday citing foreign law to
restrict the Constitution’s protections for criminal defendants and un-
popular speakers.197 Unless the Court at least makes an effort to ad-
dress these concerns, the conservative backlash against perceived “judi-
cial activism” will only grow, further imperiling the Court’s political
capital and good relations with its co-equal branches.198
                                                                                                                     
191 See Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 136, at § 702 cmt. o.
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193 See id.
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The Court needs to adopt a limiting principle that makes con-
temporary foreign legal practice relevant to some constitutional cases
but not to others.199 Jus cogens doctrine would provide the Court with a
workable rule, giving the application of foreign law a more objective
character and sharply restricting the number of occasions on which it
would be relevant, but without altering the end result in cases like At-
kins and Roper.200 The adoption of such a rule would require political
courage because it would inspire inevitable criticism from jurists hos-
tile to any application of international law.201 Given the executive and
legislative branches’ increasing hostility towards the Court and suspi-
cion of “activist judges,” the continuing political cost of not adopting
any rule may be greater still.202
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